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ARTICLES

THE "REASONABLENESS" STANDARD IN THE
LAW OF NEGLIGENCE: CAN ABSTRACT
VALUES RECEIVE THEIR DUE?
Harry S. Gerla*
I;

INTRODUCTION

For at least forty years, courts and commentators have recognized
that a jury's decision on whether a defendant in a negligence action
behaved reasonably under the circumstances involves a balancing of the
risks created by the defendant's conduct against the utility of the de-

fendant's conduct.' When the risks and utilities are concrete and readProfessor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law; J.D., Ohio State University 1975;
M.A., University of Florida 1972; B.A., Queens College 1970. The author gratefully acknowledges the suggestions and criticisms made by Barbara Ullman Gerla, Attorney at Law, Santen &
Hughes, Cincinnati, Ohio, and the research assistance furnished by Lloyd Spencer, University of
Dayton School of Law, 1990.
1. E.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); Conway v.
O'Brien, Ill F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 492 (1941); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 291-93 (1965); F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.9, at
467-68 (1986) [hereinafter HARPER & JAMES]; W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN.
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 172-73 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PRosSER & KEETON]; Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 556-64
(1972).
Some commentators have criticized the utilitarian orientation of the use of a risk-utility analysis to gauge reasonableness. E.g., Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative
Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REV. 465, 468-69
(1978); Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1980). The criticism is that risk-utility analysis fails to consider intangible values
and beliefs. PROSSER & KEETON, supra § 31, at 173 n.46. While this criticism, may be true of a
traditional cost-benefit analysis which requires that each cost and benefit be quantified and translated into a common measure such as money, see Andrews, Cost-Benefit Analysis as Regulatory
Reform, in COST BENEFIT-ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS: POLITICS, ETHICS, AND
METHODS 108 (1982), it is not true of the risk-utility test which is utilized in modern tort law. For
example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts speaks in terms of the "social value" of the interests

advanced or imperiled, not costs and benefits.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§ 291-93

(1965). The term "social value" is certainly broad enough to encompass intangible, non-monetizable risks and utilities. Indeed, the central problem discussed in this article, the psychological
tendency of individuals to underestimate abstract values, arises only because those values can and
should be considered in performing a risk-utility analysis to determine if an actor behaved reasonably under the circumstances.
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ily measured by a single standard such as money, the process of balancing should be relatively simple.2 However, when intangible, nonmonetizable interests must be weighed, the process becomes infinitely
more difficult. 8 When intangible interests are involved, the determination of the risks and utilities of an actor's conduct shifts from an almost
mechanistic cost-benefit analysis to "a moral judgment based on deliberative reflection."' 4 As Dean Calabresi notes:
If . . .either of the interests involved cannot adequately be converted
into money, the decision-maker confronts the problem of comparing
what cannot be compared except subjectively: just how important was
the actor's interest in not having an abortion (or not running over the
dog or maintaining a reputation for probity, etc.) compared to the costs
that ensued? Such questions can be answered only by assigning relative
weights to the competing sets of interests. But deciding, for example,
that not having an abortion is a more valuable interest than some quantity of money is not a factual judgment. It is a judgment about the relative importance one should attach to certain activities. Consequently, it
is an assertion about values.5
This article discusses how jurors' biases affect their evaluation of
abstract values and how courts may be able to prevent juries from underweighting those values. It begins with an overview of tort no-duty
rules and immunities which courts are rejecting in favor of a jury's
determination of whether the defendant behaved reasonably. The article then explores the importance of abstract values in determining reasonableness under the modern law of negligence. The article next discusses the experimental psychological evidence which supports the idea
that the typical juror will overweight concrete risks and underweight
abstract values and the implications of that evidence for the law of
negligence. Finally, the article discusses the legal controls which are
available to counteract the effects of psychological biases on juries' consideration of abstract values in the context of negligence law and the
advantages and disadvantages of each of those control mechanisms.

II.

TORT NO-DUTY RULES AND IMMUNITIES VERSUS REASONABLE
BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS

Frequently, juries are asked to weight values which, if not monetizable, are at least concrete and imaginable, against values which are

2. G. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW 161 n.218 (1985).
3. Id. at 161-62 n.218.
4. Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental,Safety and Health Regulation: Ethical and Philosophical Considerations,in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS: POLITICS, ETHICS AND METHODS 142 (1982).
5. G. CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 161-62 n.218.
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abstract which do not have monetizable or even tangible benefits and
are more like matters of principle. One of the main reasons for jurors
needing to balance such values is the decline in tort no-duty rules and
immunities.' Tort no-duty rules are rules of law which "shield some
kinds of negligent defendants from liability" by "expressly announc[ing] that a particular kind of defendant owes no duty of care to
a specified sort of plaintiff in certain described circumstances." ' , Tort
immunities are closely related to tort no-duty rules and operate in
much the same way. 8 Tort immunities allow a tort defendant whose
negligent conduct proximately causes a plaintiff's damages to escape
liability on the grounds that the defendant is "immune" from liability. 9
The past three decades have not been kind to either tort no-duty rules
or tort immunities (hereinafter referred to collectively as "tort no-duty
rules and immunities"). Both concepts have been in decline.1 °
Immunities such as interspousal immunity and charitable immunity have almost vanished from the landscape of twentieth century
American tort law.11 Other immunities, such as state and municipal
governmental immunity and parent-child immunity, have suffered serious ,erosions in many jurisdictions and have been completely abolished
in other jurisdictions.1 2

6. Occasionally, jurors did balance tangible harms against abstract values even before the
recent decline of tort immunities and no-duty rules. For example, in Lange v. Hoyt, 114 Conn.
590, 593, 159 A. 575, 576 (1932), the jury was permitted to decide whether the mother of an
injured child failed to act reasonably when she delayed taking her daughter to a physician for
treatment. The mother justified her conduct on the grounds that providing medical treatment for
the child would violate the mother's religious beliefs as a Christian Scientist. Id. at 596, 159 A. at
577. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors upheld submitting the reasonableness of plaintiff's
behavior to the jury under an instruction that they "were entitled to consider with all the other
evidence her conduct in the light of her belief in the doctrines of the Christian Science Church
and the extent to which she acted in accordance with them." Id. at 597, 159 A. at 578. In effect,
the jury was allowed to balance the value of the mother's religious beliefs (an abstract value)
against the tangible risk of increasing her daughter's injuries.
7. C. MORRIS & R. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 126 (2d ed. 1980).
8. Id. at 151; see also Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 952-53 (1981) (pointing out functional similarity between noduty rules and tort immunities).
9. C. MORRIS & R. MORRIs, supra note 7, at 151.
10. Schwartz, The Vitality ofNegligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV.
963, 964 (1981).
11. See, e.g., Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 648 n.7 (Mo. 1984) (In a decision
abolishing interspousal immunity in Missouri, the court notes that thirty states have abolished the
doctrine completely while eleven other states have partially abrogated it.); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 133, at 1070 (detailing the decline of charitable immunity).
12. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971);
Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980) (both completely abolishing parent-child
immunity); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963) (limiting parent-child immunity to cases involving the provision of support for children or the exercise of reasonable parental discretion); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 131, at 1052 (by the 1970s over half the
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Tort no-duty rules or limited duty rules have been suffering a similar fate. For example, the traditional notion that a landowner owed
only a limited duty of care to licensees has been rejected in a number
of jurisdictions.1 8 Indeed, beginning with the California case of Rowland v. Christian,14 more than fifteen jurisdictions have completely abrogated landowner no-duty rules in favor of an approach which requires landowners and occupiers to act reasonably with respect to all
persons on their land without regard to the legal status of those persons. 15 Other no-duty rules have suffered a similar erosion. At one time,
a police officer could not be liable to a citizen injured by a drunken
16
driver whom the officer had refused to arrest custodially. The rationale for refusing to find the officer liable was that the officer owed a duty
to the general public, not to the injured citizen." In the past five years,
a number of state supreme courts have disavowed this doctrine, known
as the "public duty rule," 18 holding that an officer can be liable to the
injured motorist or pedestrian. 19 Even the classic no-duty rule, that one
is not obliged to go to the aid of a stranger, even where a reasonable
person would do so, has been subject to severe erosion.2 0
Courts have adopted tort no-duty rules and immunities for a variety of reasons. Courts adopted some of the tort no-duty rules and immunities to protect certain values which they believed should be pro-

states had completely abolished municipal immunities).
13. E.g., Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693,
297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Pietiela v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1985).
14. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
15. For a comprehensive collection of cases rejecting and accepting the significance of plaintiff's legal status as a determinant of landowner no-duty immunity, see Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Conditioning Landowner's Liability upon Status of Injured Party as Invitee, Licensee or Trespasser, 22 A.L.R.4th 294 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
16. See generally Note, Police Liability for Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 HARV. L. REV.
821, 822-24 (1981); Annotation, Personal Liability of Policeman, Sheriff, or Similar Peace Officer or His Bond, For Injury Suffered as a Result of Failure to Enforce Law or Arrest Lawbreaker, 41 A.L.R.3d 700, 703-04 (1972 & Supp. 1988).
17. E.g., Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 520-22, 456 P.2d 376, 378-80 (1969),
overruled, Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982); Ashburn v.Anne Arundel County,
306 Md. 617, 624-33, 510 A.2d 1078, 1082-85 (1986).
18. Comment, Governmental Tort Liability: A New Limitation on the Public Duty Rule in
Massachusetts?, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 667, 675-76 (1985) (describing the "public duty rule").
19. E.g., Ransom v. City of Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 743 P.2d 70 (1987); Irwin v.
Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984); Weldy v. Town of Kingston, 128 N.H.
325, 514 A.2d 1257 (1986).
20. Exceptions to the rule that no duty exists to go to the rescue of another person have
been made on a variety of bases, such as a relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff or
the defendant and the actual wrongdoer, the contractual assumption of a duty to act by the defendant, and the control by the defendant of the instrumentality which actually injures the plaintiff. For a comprehensive list of the bases for abrogating this no-duty rule, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 313-24(A) (1965).
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tected as a matter of sound social policy. Many of these values are
abstract. 2 ' For example, the rule that a person is under no duty to go to
the aid of a stranger protects individual autonomy. 2 Parental immunities were created, in part, to protect the value of giving parents discretion in child rearing. 3
Those courts and commentators who have rejected tort no-duty
rules and immunities have not been insensitive to the values which
those devices have sought to promote. Instead, they maintain that those
values can be considered and protected when the jury ascertains
whether the defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances. For
instance, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in completely abolishing the
doctrine of parent-child immunity, noted the importance of allowing
parents flexibility in raising their children. The court went on to say
that the value of according such flexibility could be considered by the
jury when it decided whether the parent acted as the "reasonable parent." 24 Similarly, in Rowland v. Christian, the California Supreme
Court rejected landowner no-duty immunity stating that the traditional
consideration of an entrant's status as trespasser, licensee or invitee,
while not determinative of liability, could still be considered by the
finder of fact in determining whether the landowner acted reasonably
under the circumstances. 2 '
The inevitable result of the decline of tort no-duty immunities and
the concommitant increased reliance on the amorphous reasonableness
standard is that juries are more frequently confronted with the need to
weight abstract values against concrete risks often personified in the
form of an injured plaintiff. The following "hypothetical" fact situation
will illustrate this point.26
Sam Smith, a convicted armed robber, has been paroled to the custody
of a halfway house in a work release program. At the halfway house
Smith is only loosely supervised by the correctional personnel. His com21. Of course, no-duty rules and immunities may be adopted for reasons unrelated to protecting abstract values. For example, the no-duty rule precluding recovery in a negligence action
for "mental disturbance, without accompanying physical injury, illness or other physical consequences" is grounded in the concept that such a disturbance is evanescent and easily "counterfeited." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 54, at 361. Charitable immunity was adopted, at
least in part, to encourage the giving of charity and donations. Id. § 133, at 1070.
22. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 198, 200 (1973).
23.

Hollister, Parent-ChildImmunity: A Doctrine In Search of a Justification. 50 FORD-

L. REV. 489, 504-06 (1982).
24. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 599-600 (Minn. 1980); accord Hollister, supra
note 23, at 516.
25. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 119, 443 P.2d 561, 568 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104
(1968).
26. The hypothetical is loosely based upon the case of Reynolds v. Division of Parole and
Community Serv., 23 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 492 N.E.2d 172 (Ct. Cl. 1985).
HAM
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ings and goings are only lightly monitored and he is allowed a large degree of personal privacy in his room. The supervisors of the halfway
house advance two reasons for their relatively light oversight of Smith.
First, they argue that supervising parolees relatively lightly assists in
their transition back to normal society. Second, they argue that even parolees have certain rights of privacy,-and that it is just not "right" to
search randomly a parolee's room. Unfortunately, in the privacy of his
room, Smith amasses a vast library of pornographic literature, much of
it dealing with bondage and sadism. One day, instead of going to work,
Smith breaks into a house, finds Jane Jones, a young teenager home
alone, and subjects her to many of the cruelties depicted in his cache of
literature and then attempts to kill her. While the attempt is unsuccessful, the teen-ager is permanently and severely injured.
In the era of dominant tort no-duty rules and immunities, a negligence suit by the victim against the correctional personnel would, in all
likelihood, never reach the jury. First, the suit might well be dismissed
27
because of governmental immunity. Second, even if the suit was not
barred by governmental immunity, the plaintiff might still be deemed
not to have a submissible case because the defendants owed "no duty"
8
to the plaintiff to supervise Smith. Today, the suit might well be sent
to the jury in order to determine if the correctional personnel acted
29
reasonably under the circumstances.
The jury would have to weight the concrete and vividly illustrated
risks to public safety created by the relatively light supervision of
Smith against the abstract goal of effectively reintegrating former prisoners into society and the even more abstract value of according parolees some measure of privacy and human dignity. Can the jury properly
weight the abstract values of allowing even parolees some degree of
human dignity and of speeding their reintegration into society against
the tangible risk of light supervision as personified by the terribly injured teen-ager? Those courts which have abolished or restricted tort
no-duty rules and immunities implicitly assume that the answer to this
27. See, e.g., Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130, 1131-32 (Wyo. 1985). For a discussion of the
problem of state tort liability for injuries inflicted by parolees, see generally Comment, State
Liability for Injuries Inflicted by Parolees, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (1987).
28. E.g., Tarter v. State, 68 N.Y.2d 511, 519, 503 N.E.2d 84, 87, 510 N.Y.S.2d 528, 531
(1986); Reynolds v. State, 14 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74, 471 N.E.2d 776, 780 (1984) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Comment, supra note 27, at 631.
29. Comment, supra note 27, at 631. To be completely accurate, many of the cases may
actually be sent to judges sitting as the finder of fact because a large number of state statutes
abrogating or limiting state sovereign tort immunity provide that claims against the state are to be
tried by the court rather than a jury. PROssER & KEEa'ON,supra note 1, § 131, at 1045. However,
not all statutes abrogating state sovereign immunity also eliminate trial by jury. See, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 75-6101 to -6109 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to -29 (1978) (neither statute contains a provision limiting trial by jury).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/3
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question is "yes." The assumption that these courts are making is not
self-evident.
As sociologist Alan Wolfe has noted, balancing tangible harms
against intangible rights is not an easy process.30 Professor Wolfe
writes that "[h]arm is concrete, sensate, unambiguous. Rights are abstract and intellectualized, at least once removed away from immediate
experience. Weigh the two, and the argument against harm will win, at
least with the popular majorities that decide such things." l The insights of modern experimental psychology suggest that Professor
Wolfe's concerns are well-founded and that the courts that blithely assume that jurors are able to properly balance tangible and intangible
values are wrong in their assumption. Specifically, the evidence developed by cognitive psychologists indicates that the average juror cannot
accomplish that task because the average juror will tend to overweight
the concrete and vivid risk and underweight the abstract value."2 This
bias is not the result of a conscious philosophical commitment to eschewing concrete risks, but is a product of a weakness in human information processing skills.33
III.

THE ROLE OF ABSTRACT VALUES IN THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE

In a negligence action, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant's behavior constitutes a breach of her duty to use reasonable care. 4
In the words of the commonly used jury instruction, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant did not act as the reasonable and prudent
person would under the same or similar circumstances.33 Ever since the
publication of Professor Terry's 1915 Harvard Law Review article s
and Judge Learned Hand's famous opinions in Conway v. O'Brien 7
and United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,38 most courts and commenta-

tors have recognized that the basic framework for judging whether a
person acted reasonably is a utilitarian calculus in which the social
benefits of the person's behavior are weighted against the potential
risks created by that behavior.3

30. Wolfe, Dirt and Democracy, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 19, 1990, at 30.
31. Id.
32. See infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
34. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 30, at 164.
35. See, e.g., 4 R. BRANSON & A. REID, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 2320 (3d ed. 1962 &
Supp. 1989); 3 E. DEVITT, C. BLACKMAR & M. WOLFF, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 80.03 (1987).
36. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915).
37. 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940).
38. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
39. See sources cited supra note 1.
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Where the benefits and risks involve similar interests and are of
the same essential nature, the process of comparison is relatively easy.
For example, a customer's automobile .parked in a shopping center
parking lot is damaged by vandals. The owner of the automobile sues
the shopping center owner, claiming that the latter was negligent in
failing to provide adequate security for parked cars. The jury must
weight the risks to automobiles against the costs of additional security
measures that would more likely than not have prevented the damage
to the plaintiff's automobile. It should not be a difficult task for the
jury to decide whether the defendant acted reasonably. First, both the
risk created by the defendant's actions and the utility of his actions can
be measured by a common measure, money. Second, the risk and utility are both related to similar economic interests of the parties. For the
plaintiff and others similarly situated, the risk is damage to their automobiles and a concomitant loss in the automobile's market value. For
the defendant and others similarly situated, the utility of not providing
extra security is- a benefit to the financial success of the shopping center
through the maximization of revenues from the venture.
Often, the jury's task is complicated by having to compare risks
which are not only measurable by different standards, but
utilities
and
which also accrue to interests which are' not directly comparable. Suppose, in the preceding example, the crime was not the vandalization of
the plaintiff's car, but an assault and rape committed against her person. The jury would have to weight the utility of the defendant's actions, saving the monetary costs of enhanced security, against the risk
created by not providing enhanced security, increasing the chance that
someone might suffer physical injuries at the hands of criminals who
would otherwise be deterred by increased security measures on the part
of the shopping center.4 As Dean Calabresi has pointed out, the jury,
in doing a risk-utility analysis, must assign relative weights to the competing sets of interests."1 The jury must decide the relative importance
of the shopping center's interest in saving money and the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. While the task of balancing monetary
interests against personal security interests is not simple for the jury, it
is not beyond their collective imagination because both the utility of the
defendant's conduct and the risks it poses are tangible and within the
jury's common experience. The risks to the plaintiff and others simi-

40. See, e.g., Bradenton Mall Assoc. v. Hill, 508 So. 2d 538, 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(shopping center liable for failing to have adequate security to prevent rape of patron in its parking lot); Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 641, 281 S.E.2d 36, 39-40 (1981)
(assault in parking lot); Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., 297 Or. 695, 698-99, 688 P.2d 811, 813 (1984)
(robbery in parking lot).
41. G. CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 162 n.218.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/3
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larly situated are quite tangible and readily made available for the
jury's consideration in the form of an injured human plaintiff. The
monetary utility of the defendant's conduct is, however, also tangible
and readily explainable to a jury. Unless the jury is composed of spendthrifts or fantastically wealthy individuals, an unlikely event given what
is known about the composition of juries, the jury members can, to
some degree, appreciate the shopping center's need to save money because they, like the shopping center, have limited financial resources. "
In contrast, consider the case of the allegedly negligent supervision
at the halfway house of .the paroled criminal.43 The risks of loosely supervising parolees are much the same as the risks involved in the preceding shopping center example-the extent to which persons might be
victimized by crimes which would otherwise have been prevented by
more active supervision. As in the shopping center example, the risks of
physical injury are tangible and readily imaginable by the jury. However, the utility of the defendant's actions is not as identifiable to a
jury. The benefits of the defendants' loose supervision of parolees in the
halfway house are to facilitate parolees' reintegration into normal society and to accord parolees some measure of privacy which normal individuals take for granted.
The benefit of facilitating reintegration can perhaps be made tangible for the jury by explaining how the accomplishment of that goal
can reduce the risk of crimes such as the one which injured the plaintiff.4 4 The benefit of according parolees some measure of privacy and
dignity will almost surely remain a pallid abstraction for the jury. The
justification of protecting the privacy rights of parolees is virtually an
appeal to principle. No monetary benefit is received from protecting the
"rights" of parolees. Indeed, no tangible benefit is received. If society
respects the privacy rights of parolees, it is because society believes it is
the "right" thing to do.
The jury, in order to evaluate the reasonableness of the supervisors' behavior, must make a value judgment on the relative importance
of avoiding the risks to persons and property from parolees and according parolees some degree of individual freedom while speeding their
reintegration into society. The jury must then ascertain the likely magnitude of the risks created and benefits conferred by the defendants'
42. Cf. Van Dyke, The American Jury, THE CENTER MAG., May-June 1977, at 36, 44
(indicating that juries tend to be dominated by middle income individuals).
43. See supra text accompanying note 26.
44.

For a discussion of parolee reintegration, see B. MCCARTHY & B. MCCARTHY, COMMU(indicating that while behavior controls on detainees

NITY-BAsED CORRECTIONS 218, 221 (1984)

in halfway houses are necessary, constant surveillance is inappropriate and may interfere with an
inmate developing the sense of responsibility necessary for successful rehabilitation).
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conduct and factor in the relative social weights of the values in order
to judge whether the defendants acted as reasonable persons in furnishing relatively light supervision to the parolees. The jury's decisional
process on the issue of the reasonableness of the defendants' conduct
5
can be summarized in symbolic terms."
The utility of the defendants' conduct can be represented by the
following expression: WIX 1 + W 2X 2. Wl is the social weight which
the jury places on the value of reintegrating former prisoners into society. X1 is the amount of reintegration likely to occur from defendants'
policy of lightly supervising parolees. W 2 is the social weight which the
jury places on the value of according prisoners some measure of privacy. X 2 is the degree to which the parolees' interest in maintaining
some modicum of privacy is likely to be advanced by a policy of refusing to engage in regular searches of parolees' quarters.
The risks created by the defendants' actions can be represented by
the following expression: W 3 X 3. W 3 is the social weight the jury places
on the value of avoiding crimes such as that which befell the plaintiff.
X 3 is the amount of crime likely to occur because of the defendants'
policy of loosely supervising parolees.
The jury must place relative social judgment weights (represented
by the symbolic expressions Wl.3) on the values which the litigants
claim to promote or suppress. The jury may, for example, decide that
the value of preventing crimes against the person is three times as important as the value of according parolees some measure of privacy and
twice as important as the value of speeding the reintegration of former
prisoners back into society. The jury's decision can be expressed symbolically as Wl=-1; W 2 =2; and W 3 =3. The exact relative weight of
the values, e.g., whether W 3 should equal one, three, or thirty, is a
social judgment which should generally be left to the discretion of the
community as represented by the jury."" The process of weighting values should, however, be unbiased.
The jury should ascribe social weights (in symbolic terms, assign
terms
relative numbers to WI.
3) behind what philosopher John-Rawls
"a veil of ignorance." ' "1 To paraphrase Rawls, the jurors should not
allow their decision on weighting the relative values to be affected by
45. The technique of representing the risk-utility balance in symbolic terms is borrowed
from Judge Hand's opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947). The formula used in this article is derived from the formula used by Hammond and Addman in assisting the Denver City Council to decide whether to allow police officers to use hollow
point bullets. Hammond & Adelman, Science, Values and Human Judgment, 194 SCIENCE 389,
393-94 (1976).
46. For a discussion of who should decide the relative social importance of competing values, see infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
47. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971).
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how their decision might impact on themselves personally or on the
actual litigants in the case. 8 The jurors should "evaluate principles
solely on the basis of general considerations."'4 9 Thus, in the halfway
house case, the relative weights which the jurors would place on the
values (of avoiding crimes against persons, reintegrating former prisoners into society and according parolees some measure of privacy rights)
when considering those values in isolation should not differ from the
weights the jurors would place on the values when considering them in
the context of Ms. Jones' suit.
The evidence produced by psychological experiments suggests that
the relative weights jurors would place on the three values behind a
Rawlsian veil of ignorance differ substantially from the relative weights
which the jurors place on the values when confronted with the facts of
an actual case. Specifically, experimental psychology indicates that,
when confronted with the facts of a particular case, jurors will systematically underweight the abstract values (in the example, reintegrating
former prisoners into society and according parolees a measure of privacy) and overweight concrete values (in our example, preventing
crimes against the person). To put the point in symbolic terms, even if
the jurors believed as a matter of general principle that all three values
should be weighted equally, i.e. W 1-3 = 1, they are apt in an actual case
to weight W3 more heavily, i.e. WI. 2 = 1, W3 =>1. The difference in
weights occurs because the values of according parolees privacy and
reintegrating former prisoners into society are abstract and intangible,
while the risks of facilitating crimes against persons are concrete, tangible, and readily visible to the jury in the form of the injured plaintiff.
The psychological evidence which gives rise to this conclusion will be
explored in the next section of this article.
A.

The Human Psychological Biases Which Affect Jurors

Beginning in the early 1970s, cognitive psychologists conducted a
great number of studies of errors in human decision making. 0 The psychologists' research indicated that errors in human judgment are not
simply random mistakes, but are systematic manifestations (called "biases") of the inappropriate use of mental shortcuts (called "heuristics"). 5' Numerous biases have been identified.52 Three interrelated bi48.
49.

Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 137.

50. See Jungerman, Two Camps on Rationality, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 627, 627-32 (1986).

51. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SciENCE 1124, 1124 (1974).
52. See generally L. BOURNE, R. DOMINOWSKI & E. LOFTUS, COGNITIVE PROCESSES 284-99
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ases are particularly important in understanding how juries may
systematically underweight abstract values in negligence cases. The
first bias is a tendency to place more weight on concrete, emotionally
53
interesting information than on more probative abstract data. For the
sake of convenience, this bias shall be referred to as the "vividness
bias." The bias is illustrated by the following experiment performed by
Borgida and Nisbett. Psychology students at the University of Michigan were asked to select courses they wished to take in the psychology
department. In one phase of the experiment students were given two
sources of information. One source was the statistical summary of the
comments of the entire population of students taking the course. The
54
other source was the live comments of three students. Statistically,
the impressions of the complete population are more likely to be accurate than the impressions of a possibly unrepresentative sample of three
students.5 5 Nonetheless, the student subjects were much more influenced by the live testimony of three students than by the cold, but
probably more accurate, aggregate data.56
The second bias which may affect jurors is called the "availability" bias. People affected by this bias judge the probability of an event
not by the actual likelihood of its happening, but by the ease with
57
which they can recall particular instances of the event's occurrence.
The following experiment, conducted by Professors Kahneman and
Tversky, illustrates this bias. Subjects were asked to estimate in relative terms the number of words in which the letter "r"appears as the
first letter of the word versus the number of words in which the letter
"r" is the third letter of the word.58 The subjects consistently judged
that words containing the letter "r"as the initial letter outnumbered
words containing the "r" as the tertiary letter." In fact, words with "r"
(1979); Jungerman, supra note 50, at 629-32; Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing:
Trial by Heuristics, 15 L. & Soc'Y REV. 123, 132-45 (1980).
53. R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SoCIAL JUDGMENT 55-61 (1980).
54. Borgida & Nisbett, The Differential Impact of Abstract vs. Concrete Information on
Decisions, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 258, 261 (1977).
55. The reason the reports of the large group of students would be more likely to be accurate than the observations of the live panel of students is the statistical principle known as "the
law of large numbers." The principle states that the larger the sample size, the more likely the
sample is an accurate reflection of the population as a whole. R. NISBETT & L. Ross, supra note
53, at 77-78. Thus, the summarized information of the large group of students is more likely to
reflect accurately the views of the entire population of students than the information given by the
small panel of live students.
56. •Borgida & Nisbett, supra note 54, at 266.
57. M. EYSENCK, A HANDBOOK OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 297 (1984).
58. Tversky & Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 207, 212 (1973).
59. Id.
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as the third letter are much more common than words in which "r" is
the initial letter. 60 The reason subjects continually made this mistake is
that words which began with the letter "r" are much easier to recall
than words which have "r" as the third letter.61
The third bias which may unduly influence the determination of
reasonableness by jurors is the "saliency" bias. A saliency bias is the
tendency of "colorful, dynamic, or other distinctive stimuli [to] disproportionately engage attention and accordingly affect judgments."62 This
bias is illustrated by experiments which demonstrate that individuals
who are brightly lit, moving or highly contrasting (e.g., through wearing a different color shirt) draw a disproportionate amount of perceptual attention.63
The biases described in this section tend to operate in most human
beings. 6 ' When a jury considers whether an actor behaved reasonably
under the circumstances, it must weight abstract values which are possible justifications for the actor's behavior. These biases will usually
lead the jury to underweight the abstract justifications for the behavior
and overweight the concrete risks created by that behavior.
The manner in which vividness, availability and salience biases can
adversely impact a jury's ability to weight abstract values in determining if an actor behaved "reasonably" is easily appreciated by once
again considering the hypothetical case of the teen-ager who has been
assaulted by a prisoner from a halfway house. The jury, in assessing
whether the correctional personnel's policy of loose supervision of residents was reasonable, will have to weight the benefits of speeding convicts' reintegration into society and according them a measure of personal dignity, against the risk that, by loosely supervising the residents,
they will be able to commit crimes such as that which Smith committed against Jones.
The values of reintegrating prisoners into society and protecting
their privacy are not likely to provoke vivid imagery in the minds of the
jurors. The values are apt to remain pallid intellectual abstractions for
most of the members of the jury. If the jurors have any commitment to
the values of reintegrating prisoners into society and according them a

60.
61.
62.

Id. at 211.
Id.
Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 192 (1982).
63. Id. at 193.
64. See Jungerman, supra note 50, at 627, 629-32 (discussing studies indicating pervasiveness of biases). But see id. at 633-37 (discussing studies purporting to show that the bias exists in
the research on biases rather than human beings themselves); Fischhoff, Judgment and Decision
Making, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN THOUGHT 178-82 (1988) (discussing the controversy
over the existence and extent of cognitive biases).
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measure of privacy, that commitment will most likely be a cold intellectual commitment rather than a passionate visceral commitment.
This point can be illustrated by considering precisely how the defendants would relate to the jury the benefits of giving the inmates of
the halfway house a certain degree of freedom. The benefits would have
to be related to the jury by the testimony of the correctional personnel,

criminologists, psychologists or perhaps the prisoners themselves. Such
testimony is likely to be dry and abstract rather than concrete and
vivid. It is true that an able defense lawyer may be able to bring the
points the witnesses are making home to the jury more effectively by

eliciting anecdotes which help the jurors to visualize the abstract benefits of loosely supervising the prisoners. This technique can, however, be
utilized only to a limited extent because one of the utilities of loosely

supervising the prisoners, according them a measure of personal dignity, ultimately manifests itself only in the minds of the prisoners and
the members of society.
The jurors are also unlikely to be able to recall instances of suc-

cessful reintegration of former prisoners into society or instances of
abuse of the privacy rights of former prisoners. For the ordinary juror,
the issues of criminal rehabilitation and the rights of prisoners or parolees are not apt to be everyday concerns.6 5 Moreover, stories dealing

with these issues do not seem to. proliferate in the mass media."
The contrast between these abstract values and the risk that the
denizens of the halfway house will commit crimes against innocent vic-

tims could not be more marked. First, the very presence of the physically injured victim in the courtroom can provide the jury with a concrete and vivid illustration of the costs of loosely supervising the
parolees. 67 The ease of comprehension provided by the plaintiff's pres65. In a 1986 CBS/New York Times poll, people were asked what was the most important
problem facing their community. Prisons and penal reform did not make the list. UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1988, 183 (1989) [hereinafter
DOJ SOURCEBOOK]. In contrast, 8% of the people responding listed crime as the most important
problem facing their community. Id. Between 1980 and 1987, prisons and penal reform did not
make the Gallup poll list of the most important problems facing the nation. Id. at 182. In contrast, crime consistently was mentioned by between two and five percent of respondents as the
most important problem facing the United States. Id.
66. The New York Times printed only 85 stories on prison conditions during 1988. During
the same year, it printed 281 stories on crimes and criminals. NEW YORK TIMES INDEX (1988).
The disparity between the number of stories on prisons and'the number of stories on crime is
likely to be much greater in the electronic media and in print media which do not purport to be
"newspapers of record."
67. All courts agree that if the plaintiff has the capacity to assist in the presentation of her
case, or to understand the proceedings, she has a right to be present in the courtroom. Where the
plaintiff lacks the capacity to assist in the presentation of her case, courts are split on whether she
has a constitutional or common law right to be present in the courtroom when her presence might
unduly prejudice the jurors. Grunes, Exclusion of Plaintiffs from the Courtroom in Personal
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ence can be reinforced by evidence such as the plaintiff's testimony, the
testimony of treating physicians, and photographs depicting the physical trauma the plaintiff has suffered.68
Second, the jury is likely to recall an actual case or to imagine a
situation in which a convicted criminal would commit another crime. If
crime statistics are correct, a far larger number of jurors, or their close
family members, will be a victim of crime than will be a prisoner. 69
The jurors are also bombarded with stories in the mass media on crime,
at least some of them dealing with crimes committed by persons on

parole or furlough from incarceration.

°

In the halfway house hypothetical case, all three biases will favor

overweighting the cost in the form of increased crime and underweighting the benefits in terms of eased reintegration of the former prisoners
into society and according the prisoners a measure of privacy. The risk
of criminal assault is concrete and vivid and instances of such assaults
are readily recallable. The benefits of reintegration and the rights of
parolees to a modicum of privacy are abstract, emotionally uninteresting and unlikely to be represented by readily available examples in the

minds of the jurors.
The three biases which impact the jury's appreciation of abstract
values in the hypothetical case will normally lead to a systematic depreciation of all abstract values because abstract values tend to share
the characteristics exhibited by the values of reintegrating prisoners

and according them a measure of personal dignity. Abstract values, in
general, are pallid and do not manifest themselves in instances which
Injury Actions: A Matter of Discretion or Right, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 388-89 (1988).
68. Photographic evidence of the plaintiffs injuries-which is likely to reinforce in the minds
of the jurors the vividness and concreteness of the risks of the defendants' conduct-is likely to be
admissible. See generally 3 C. SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1222 (2d ed. 1969).
69. The conclusion that many more people are or will be familiar with victims of crime than
are or will be familiar with inmates is inevitable given that many individual criminals commit
multiple offenses victimizing several persons and that not all criminals are apprehended. C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 75-78 (1978). Gross statistics also support this
conclusion. The United States Department of Justice estimates that 37,730,820 crimes were committed in 1988 and that 24.4% of all households were "touched by a crime." DOJ SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 65, at 285, 319. At the end of 1988, the total federal and state prison population was
556,748. Id. at 612. These statistics show that the pool of victims of crime is much larger than the
pool of inmates.
70. S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER 62-63 (1984) (noting the extensive
media coverage of crime and pointing out that media coverage of crime includes not only stories of
actual crimes, but a significant number of stories involving crime in fictional entertainment programs). The most notorious recent story of a person committing a crime while on parole or leave
from prison is the tale of Willie Horton. While on furlough from a Massachusetts prison, Willie
Horton raped a woman in Maryland. J. GERMOND & J. WITCOVER, WHOSE BROAD STRIPES AND
BRIGHT STARS 10-11 (1989). In the 1988 presidential election, the Bush campaign effectively used
the story of Horton's crime to label Bush's opponent, Governor Michael Dukakis, as "soft-oncrime." by
Id.eCommons, 1989
Published

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15:2

are promptly recollected by the average person." Given that ordinary
individuals, because of prevailing psychological biases, tend to give abstract values less importance than they would merit in a fair decisionmaking process, the question of how to assure that those values are
72
weighted by juries in an unbiased manner must be addressed. The
next section of this article turns to that task.
B.

The Methodology of Protecting Abstract Values

Not all abstract values are entitled to the same protection. Some
abstract values are not only viewed as important by most members of
our society, but are constitutionally enshrined, such as the freedom of
speech73 or the free exercise of religion.7 4 Other abstract values, such
as the need for parents to have leeway in raising their children, while
not necessarily of constitutional import, command wide support. In
contrast, some abstract values, such as a notion of the sovereign rights
75
of the owner of land, would find little support in today's society. Fi-

71. The objection may be raised that the biases discussed relate to non-social judgments
rather than to social judgments, the judgments that the jury must make in determining if the risks
of an actor's conduct outweights the utility of the actor's conduct. Professor Shelley Taylor of
UCLA Medical School points out there are several reasons for questioning the supposed dichotomy between social and non-social judgments. First, the distinction between social and non-social
judgments is somewhat arbitrary. Taylor, supra note 62, at 191. While a decision on whether
more words in the English language contain the letter "r" as the first letter or the tertiary letter
may not seem to be a social judgment, see Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 51, at 1127, a
decision on which psychology classes students prefer can at least arguably be viewed as something
of a social decision, see Borgida &-Nisbett, supra note 54, at 261-62. Second, social judgments
involve the same kind of uncertainty as non-social judgments. Taylor, supra note 62, at 191.
Third, social judgments involve even more uncertainty than non-social judgments because the person making the judgment is dealing with human beings who do not always openly display their
attributes, attitudes, and beliefs. Id. Some empirical evidence exists supporting Professor Taylor's
position that the psychological biases discussed in this article affect social judgments. See Reyes,
Thompson & Bower, Judgmental Biases Resulting From Differing Availability of Arguments, 39
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 2, 8 (1980) (experiment indicating that availability and
vividness biases affected mock jurors judgments on guilt or innocence of suspect).
72. Even scholars who are skeptical of the significance of cognitive biases in human psychology need not necessarily disagree with the conclusion that those biases -may adversely affect the
ability of juries to balance tangible risks against abstract benefits in negligence cases. One of these
scholars argues that the psychological biases have few direct consequences in everyday life.
Fischhoff, supra note 64, at 180. As Professor Fischhoff has pointed out:
if biases do'not affect most decisions, there will not be the feedback. As a result people may
be particularly vulnerable to the effects of suboptimal judgments and decision making in
those, perhaps few, situations in which accuracy is crucial . . . when they need to get
things right the first time.
Id. A jury's decision on whether tangible risks outweight abstract utility may well be for the
jurors one of those unique situations which is foreign to their experience and in which they must
"get things right the first time."
73. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
74. Id.
75. Cf. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 116, 443 P.2d 561, 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102
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nally some abstract values, such as maintaining racial purity, are positively abhorrent to most members of our society and in fact run counter
to the values incorporated in the United States Constitution. 76
A decision to pick and choose which abstract values are more important may seem arbitrary. Perhaps such a decision is indeed arbitrary, but unless one wishes to descend into a morass of anarchy or
pure relativism, in which values such as maintaining racial purity have
equal footing with values such as maintaining racial equality, such
choices must be made. Courts (and legislatures) have been making
such choices for hundreds of years. Courts have chosen to protect the
abstract value of individual autonomy by creating a no-duty rule that
one need not go to the aid of a stranger, except under limited circumstances. 7 Courts have not sought to protect the abstract value of obtaining pleasure from the suffering of others by granting immunity for
sadistic acts and practices."8 In sum, before deciding how to protect
abstract values, courts will first have. to decide which abstract values to
protect.
Once a court has decided what abstract values to protect, it must
determine how to protect them. At this point, it would be in the best
tradition of legal scholarship to propose some brilliant all-purpose
scheme for protecting abstract values in the law of negligence without
sanctifying them to the point of overweighting them. Unfortunately, no
such "magic bullet" exists. Courts (and even the advocates who practice in them) do have available to them a variety of techniques to alleviate the tendency of jurors to underweight abstract values. These techniques will not work in all circumstances and may have serious costs
associated with them. A perverse relationship seems to exist between
the efficacy of the techniques in protecting abstract values and the undesirable costs imposed by the techniques. The more effective the technique is in protecting abstract values, the larger the undesirable costs it
imposes. Conversely, the fewer undesirable "side effects" a technique
has, the less effective it is in protecting abstract values.
The relationship between efficacy in shielding abstract values and
the costs imposed by the technique (which perhaps should be termed
the "iron law of protection of abstract values") forces courts to choose

(1968); Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 100 Vt. 414, 418, 139 A. 440, 442 (1927)
(both questioning applicability of feudal notions of land ownership to modern society).
76. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (striking down anti-miscegenation statutes on equal protection grounds and rejecting maintenance of racial purity as a legitimate state
objective).
77. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 56, at 375.
78. Indeed, the intentional infliction of emotional distress gives rise to tort liability. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF 1989
TORTS § 46 (1965).
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among unpleasant alternatives. In protecting' abstract values from underweighting by jurors, courts may opt for different techniques or a
mix of different techniques depending upon the importance which
courts attach to the value they are trying to protect and the courts'
assessment of the costs and benefits of the protective methods they
choose. This article now explores the efficacy and costs of the various
techniques for protecting abstract values from systematic underweighting by jurors.
C. Retaining .Tort Immunities and No-Duty Rules
The preservation of tort no-duty rules and immunities would seem
to be an appropriate tactic for protecting abstract values since the decline of such rules and immunities increased the need for juries to balance abstract values against tangible costs.79 Tort no-duty rules and
immunities are certainly efficacious in protecting abstract values. For
example, the value of affording parents discretion in raising their children is certainly protected by parent-child immunity which shields the
former for negligence suits by the latter."0 The value of an individual's
autonomy in deciding what actions she should take or whom she should
aid is preserved by the no-duty rule that one is under no obligation to
go to the aid of a stranger.81 Unfortunately, tort no-duty rules and immunities often protect abstract values too well, giving those values virtually absolute protection, a result which courts find difficult to
tolerate. 2
A pure parental immunity would allow a parent to injure his or
her child by drunkenly driving at excessive speeds in a car without
brakes. A strict landowner no-duty rule would allow a landowner or
occupier to injure hundreds of discovered trespassers by failing to take
simple and low cost precautions in conducting active operations on her
land. An increasing number of courts have been unwilling to accept the
first result,8 and virtually all courts would reject the second result.8 4
Courts simply cannot live with most unalloyed tort no-duty rules or
immunities.8 5 Thus, a court which is unwilling to abrogate a tort no-

79. See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text.
80. Hollister, supra note 23, at 516.
81. See Epstein, supra note 22, at 197.
82. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d
669 (Del. 1976); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royale, 202 Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 820 (1983).
84. Maldonado v. Jack M. Berry Grove Corp., 351 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1977); Kumkumian v.
City of New York, 305 N.Y. 167, 111 N.E.2d 865 (1953); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
336 (1965); 5 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 1, § 27.6, at 193; J. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES
LIABILITY

§ 2.5 (2d ed. 1988).

85. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/3
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duty rule or immunity must tinker with the rule or immunity in order
to save it. The tinkering, takes two related forms.
One form of tinkering abrogates the rule or immunity except for
broadly defined residual areas where the rule or immunity remains in
force because the court believes that the application of the rule or immunity is particularly important in that area. For example, some courts
which have abrogated parental immunity have retained it in matters of
reasonable "parental authority over the child" and the "exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care."86 Virtually
all courts that have stripped away municipal immunity have retained it
in cases involving "discretionary functions" of the municipal
government."7
The other form of tinkering rejects the use of broadly defined categorical areas in which the tort no-duty rule and immunity is to continue in force. Instead, this method relies on numerous detailed rules of
law which set forth the circumstances under which the no-duty or immunity does or does not apply, thereby limiting the no-duty rules or
immunities. The best example of this process is the classic landowner
no-duty rule based upon the status of the plaintiff."8 Thus, most courts
which recognize traditional landowner no-duty rules also hold that a
landowner must use due care in the conduct of active operations to
protect a trespasser whom she has discovered upon her land,89 and that
licensee must be warned of artificial or natural conditions which are
highly dangerous and which the licensee is unlikely to discover for
himself.9 0
Both approaches to mitigating the harshness of no-duty rules have
their faults. The first approach may still leave circumstances where patently unreasonable and socially wasteful conduct is protected by the
tort no-duty rule or immunity because, by definition, behavior with
risks that outweight its utility is protected by the no-duty rule as long
as the behavior falls within the residual area covered by the no-duty
rule or immunity. Moreover, issues of.whether particular conduct falls
inside or outside the residual areas often prove intractable for courts
attempting to apply the distinctions they have created. Courts have

103 (1968) (noting that while original landowner no-duty immunities were simple,. complexity was
engendered by courts attempting to achieve "just rules in our modern society").
86. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413, 122'N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963); accord Wagner ex
rel. Griffith v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255, 256 (Iowa 1983).
87. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 131, at 1052-53.
88. Id. § 58, at 393; 5 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 1, § 27.1, at 129-31.
89. See sources cited supra note 84.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965); J. PAGE, supra note 84, § 3.8, at 44.
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struggled with defining what a discretionary governmental function is
or what the ambit of parental discretion in raising children encompasses. These struggles illustrate just how difficult it is for courts to
apply their own distinctions which were created to salvage tort no-duty
rules and immunities by carving out broad areas where the rules and
immunities will remain in effect. 9
The second approach, attempting to control tort no-duty rules and
immunities through detailed rules of law, often leads to systems of
Ptolemaic complexity with rules depending on distinctions courts find
extremely difficult to make in practice.9 2 The classic illustration of this
phenomenon is the complexity of landowner no-duty rules. Not only is
the extent of the landowner no-duty rule dependent upon the status of
the plaintiff as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee, but also inter alia upon
(a) the age of the plaintiff,93 (b) whether the thing which injures the
plaintiff stems from a condition on the land or an active operation,"
and (c) whether the activity or condition threatens the plaintiff with

91. The distinction between governmental functions (which enjoyed municipal immunity)
and proprietary functions (which did not) has been described by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as "one of the most unsatisfactory known to the law, for it has caused confusion not only
among the various jurisdictions but almost always within each jurisdiction." Ayala v. Philadelphia
Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 597, 305 A.2d 877, 883-84 (1973) (quoting K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.07, at 460 (1958)). The court illustrated the confusion the distinction engendered by noting that in prior decisions it had held an after hours school recreation
program to be a governmental function, but a summer school recreation program to be proprietary
function. Id. at 598, 305 A.2d at 884 (citing Shields v. Pittsburg School Dist., 408 Pa. 388, 184
A.2d 240 (1960) and Morris v. Mount Lebanon Township School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 636, 144
A.2d 737, 738 (1958)).
In the area of parent-child immunity, courts which have retained the immunity in cases of
the exercise of ordinary parental authority and discretion with respect to food, clothing, housing,
medical services and other care, have also experienced great difficulty in determining whether
particular parental conduct falls within the zone of retained immunity. Hollister, supra note 23, at
513-14. Professor Hollister notes that courts have held that leaving a vaporizer where a fifteen
month old child could reach it was considered negligent parental supervision and therefore not the
exercise of ordinary or reasonable discretion, but that leaving an eight month old child alone for a
few minutes during which time she chewed on an electrical extension cord was "held to involve
parental discretion with respect to housing and other care." Id. at 513. Professor Hollister further
notes that courts have split over whether failure to supervise a child is within the bounds of ordinary parental discretion at all. Id. at 514.
92. See sources cited supra note 88.
93. Landowners owe a greater duty of care to trespassing children than to trespassing
adults. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965). Landowners must take reasonable steps
to protect children against artificial hazards which they are unlikely to discover on their own. Id.
Numerous courts have applied this rule. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 110, 193 A. 608
(1937); Jones v. Billings, 289 A.2d 39 (Me. 1972); Schofield v. Merrill, 386 Mass. 244, 435
N.E.2d 339 (1982); Larson v. Equity Coop. Elevator Co., 248 Wis. 132, 21 N.W.2d 253 (1946).
94. See, e.g., Linxwiler v. El Dorado Sports Center, Inc., 233 Ark. 191, 343 S.W.2d 411
(1961); Hardin v. Harris, 507 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 341
(1965) (all requiring the owner or occupier of land to use ordinary due care with respect to licensees when conducting active operations on the land).
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serious bodily harm or merely ordinary bodily harm. 5 To make matters worse, courts do not necessarily agree on the significance of these
factors. 96
The difficulty of drawing the distinctions occasioned by the cluster
of standards surrounding landowner no-duty rules is quite apparent to
anyone who has tried to explain why a person "cutting through a department store to save time" is a licensee, but a person entering the
department store to use a public telephone maintained for the convenience of customers is an invitee.9 7 These complexities and confusions
are generated by a tangle of rules which Justice Burke, dissenting in
Rowland v. Christian, described as "supply[ing] a reasonable and

workable approach to the problems involved, and one which provides
the degree of stability and predictability so highly prized in the law." ' 8
The unintentional and amusing irony in Justice Burke's description of
landowner no-duty rules can be appreciated by anyone who has attempted to slog through this confusing subject. Attempting to protect

abstract values through tort no-duty rules or immunities tempered by
specific legal rules limiting their application often produces unworkable

complexity and confusion rather than workable stability and
predictability.
Retaining tort no-duty rules and immunities will effectively protect
abstract values. Unfortunately, retaining them will also exact a high

price by encouraging unreasonable and socially wasteful behavior, or
by creating complex and unmanageable systems of rules.
D.

Judicial Intervention in the Balancing Process

Judicial activity aimed at protecting abstract values can take a variety of forms. The tort no-duty rules and immunities discussed in the
preceding section are, by and large, judge-made, and thus can be seen

as a form of judicial interventionism in defense of abstract values. A
closely related form of judicial intervention is the attempt to protect
abstract values by "crystalliz[ing] the law into mechanical rules . . . of
95. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 334 (1965) (requiring owners and occupiers of land to use reasonable care in carrying on activities which threaten constant trespassers
on a limited area with death or serious bodily harm) with id. § 336 (requiring owners and occupiers of land to use reasonable care in carrying on activities which threaten discovered trespassers
with physical harm).
96. Compare Gray v. Sentinel Auto Parks Co., 265 Md. 61, 288 A.2d 121 (1972) (holding
that landowner need only refrain from wilfully and wantonly injuring licensee) with Osterman v.
Peters, 260 Md. 313, 272 A.2d 21 (1971) and Elliott v. Nagy, 22 Ohio St. 3d 58, 488 N.E.2d 853
(1986) (both rejecting the notion that landowner owes any special duty to child trespassers).
97. J. PAGE, supra note 84, § 4.3. Professor Page terms the distinction "tenuous." Id. Professor Page is being somewhat charitable in his evaluation of the distinction.
98. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 120, 443 P.2d 561, 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 105
(1968) (Burke, J., dissenting).

Published by eCommons, 1989

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15:2

universal application." 99
Rules of law formulated by judges on a case by case basis will, in
.theory, eventually protect abstract values. That protection comes, however, at a very high price. Attempting to protect abstract values by
creating rules in concrete terms to be applied to a special class of cases
will eventually generate an overly complex and unmanageable system
of rules, much as the attempt to limit landowner no-duty immunities by
specific concrete rules has generated a nightmarishly complex and unwieldy system. 0 0
These concrete rules will also be useless in unusual situations and
be unadaptable to changing conditions. The notion that concrete rules
of conduct ought to replace the amorphous negligence standard is not
new. In the early twentieth century, Justice Holmes and many other
judges placed a great deal of faith in the ability of common law courts
to develop rules of law which would relieve a jury of the task of deciding whether particular behavior was reasonable and leave the jury only
with the task of determining what actually occurred in a particular
case. 10 1 The attempt to formulate mechanical rules in this fashion foundered because of the rules' inability to deal with changed or unusual
circumstances, and the rules themselves fell into disuse.10 2 At times it is
more dangerous to stop one's car, get out, look and listen at a railroad
crossing than simply to proceed across the tracks. 10 3 A rule that required all vehicles to stop at railroad crossings may have made some
sense in an era when motor vehicles were comparatively rare. It is a
prescription for massive inconvenience and dislocation in an era of
heavy vehicular traffic. Mechanical mini-rules of law, designed to protect abstract values, are likely to suffer the same disadvantage.
Another possible judge-oriented solution to the problem of protecting abstract values is to commit the process of determining the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct (or the plaintiff's conduct in case of
a defense of contributory or comparative negligence) to the court when
abstract values are plausibly alleged to justify the actor's conduct. Giving judges the task of balancing abstract values against tangible interests is hardly a remarkable development in the law. For example, in
deciding constitutional issues, judges balance the state's need for an
expeditious and administratively efficient procedure against an individual's right to due process,1 04 the state's need to prevent violence and

99. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 35, at 217-18 (footnote omitted).
100. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
101. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 35, at 218-19.
102. C. MORRIS & R. MORRIS, supra note 7, at 60.
103. Pakora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934).
104. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (in deciding whether due
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/3
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disorder against an individual's right to freedom of expression, 10 5 and
the state's need to combat crime against an individual's right of privacy
in the guise of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 10 6
Of course, merely because questions involving the balancing of abstract values against tangible harms are routinely committed by the
law to decision by judges does not necessarily mean that judges are any
better at properly weighting those values than ordinary jurors. Indeed,
given that judges are human beings, one would suspect that they are
subject to the same cognitive biases as their fellow mortals. If judges
are in fact subject to the same cognitive biases, one could legitimately
question the efficacy of protecting abstract values by allowing judges to
determine the reasonableness of an actor's behavior when abstract values are alleged to justify that behavior. No psychological studies have
been made on judges to determine the extent to which they are affected
by the typical cognitive biases. However, good reasons exist to suspect
that judges, unlike ordinary jurors, may be relatively less apt to underweight abstract values because of cognitive biases.
The vividness, availability and saliency biases, to some extent, operate on the basis that individuals are much more likely to credit and
appreciate the familiar or readily imaginable fact or value more than
the unfamiliar fact or value.' Judges are more likely to be familiar
with and appreciate abstractions and abstract values than are jurors.
First, judges are generally trained as attorneys. Whatever else legal
training accomplishes, one cannot deny that it does teach the student to
deal with abstractions in the form of legal concepts.' 08 Throughout the
curriculum, the law student is exposed to abstractions because legal
doctrines are themselves abstractions.' 0 9 Indeed, in the course of their
legal education, students must frequently consider the specific question
of how to balance tangible harms against abstract principles. In constitutional law, students consider the extent to which tangible harm to the

process requires hearing before termination of Social Security disability payments, administrative
burden and other societal costs must be taken into account).
105. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (balancing state's interest in
preventing violence and the individual's freedom of expression saying that the state may not forbid
"advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
106. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981) (noting that the Supreme
Court, in a series of cases, has balanced the intrusion on the personal security of persons detained
by police against "substantial law enforcement interests").
107. See supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
108. Cf. Cramton, The Current State of Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321, 331
(1982) (criticizing what the author perceives as an overemphasis on semi-abstract conceptualism
in the legal curriculum).
109. Cf. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8-9 (1948) (perceiving the creation of legal doctrine as a never ending circle).
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community must be endured to promote the values of freedom of
speech, religion, or individual privacy.110 Criminal procedure students
consider the extent to which the community's tangible interest in fighting crime must be subordinated to the individual's abstract rights to
privacy and to be free from being compelled to take part in her own
incrimination." 1
Second, judges are faced with issues requiring the balancing of.

abstract values against tangible consequences more often than lay persons. For example, every time a judge must decide whether to suppress

a confession or other evidence on the grounds that it was illegally obtained or seized, she must consciously balance the abstract values of

privacy and freedom from being forced to participate in one's own
downfall against the tangible consequence of possibly making it more
difficult to convict a factually guilty party. 2 Every time a judge must
decide whether to force a child to receive medical treatment over the

religiously-based objections of the child's parents, she must consciously
balance the values of freedom of religion and parental discretion in
raising children against the tangible harm which might befall the
child. "' Thus, by training and experience, judges are not only likely to
have dealt with abstract values, but also to have been required to balance those values against tangible harms. This may, to some extent,
counteract the availability and saliency biases of judges."" Judges' ex-

110. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 873-86, 106368 (2d ed. 1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 841-56, 1251-75 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussions in student-oriented constitutional law texts of cases attempting to balance freedom of
speech against possibility incitement to violence or other illegal activity and cases attempting to
strike balance between free exercise of religion and tangible harms such as threats to health and
safety and military discipline).
11l. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 67-68 (1985) (discussion in
student-oriented criminal procedure text of extent to which courts weigh constitutional guarantees
against compulsory self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures against the impact
of these protections on police efficiency).
112. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2883 (interim ed. 1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (emphasizing the need to balance freedom from compelled self-incrimination
against the need to arrest and convict violators of the law); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,
699-701 (1981) (discussing need to balance right of privacy in guise of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures against need for effective law enforcement).
113. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 901, 278 N.E.2d 918, 919, 328 N.Y.S.2d
686, 687 (1972) (requiring medical treatment where necessary to save the life of the child); In re
Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (medical treatment not compelled).
114. The reason that experience is not certain to counteract the biases is that the susceptibility of the biases to correction is far from clear. Empirical studies on the success of debiasing
give no clear indication on the optimal techniques for overcoming psychological biases, or whether
such biases can even be overcome. See Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 422 (1982); see also Edwards & Winterfeldt, On Cognitive Illusions and
Their Implications, in JUDGMENT. AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 642,
657-59 (1986).
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periences in dealing with abstract values may, to a limited extent, overcome the vividness bias. In their own minds, judges may tend to view
the values with which they must deal so often as concrete realities
rather than as abstractions.
While judges may be more likely than ordinary jurors to evaluate
abstract values adequately, they are certainly not perfect Platonic
guardians of those values. Judges probably cannot free themselves totally from normal psychological biases against abstract values. Therefore, allowing judges to determine reasonableness will not furnish complete assurance that abstract values will be given their appropriate
weight. Some abstract values will be slighted even if judges are deciding the reasonableness of the actor's behavior. Moreover, allowing
judges to strike the balance between abstract values and tangible
harms in determining if an actor behaved reasonably under the circumstances entails serious problems.
Committing the balancing process to judges may run afoul of federal and state constitutional guarantees of the right to trial by jury. 1 5
This problem can be alleviated to some extent by taking advantage of
the fuzziness of the line -between questions of fact and questions of law
and perhaps allowing some judicial balancing under the guise of deciding an issue as a matter of law.'
Even more serious than constitutional impediments is the fundamental policy question of whether important decisions on what weights
are to be placed on competing values should be relegated to judges.
The decision on what weight to give a particular value (abstract or
otherwise) is a social decision. Using the earlier symbolic formula, the
value at which to set W1 ... x represents a social value judgment." 7
Judges are a highly unrepresentative cross section of society. Judges
are more predominantly male, white, and wealthy than the body politic
as a whole."' While juries are perhaps also unrepresentative of their
communities, they mirror the characteristics of those communities
much closer than do judges."19 Should a highly unrepresentative group,
such as judges, make fundamental decisions about the importance of
competing values? The question is not easily answered. The issue in one

115. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 9;
N.Y. CONST. art I, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5 (all guaranteeing right to jury trial).
116. Vinson, Tort Reform the Old-Fashioned Way: By Trial and Appellate Judges, 1987
DET. C.L. REV. 987, 1001-02 (author suggests jury discretion should be curbed by taking advantage of the "fuzzy" line between questions of law and fact).
117. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
118. V. HANS & N. VIDMAR. JUDGING THE JURY 247-48 (1986); C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE
AND THE JURY 65 (1962).
119. See sources cited supra note 118. But see Van Dyke, supra note 42, at 44 (indicating
juries tend to be more white, male and middle income than their communities).
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guise or another has sparked voluminous and often bitter debates in a
variety of areas of law. 120 Those debates will not be resolved in this
article. All that can be done at this point is to recognize that allowing
judges to determine reasonableness when abstract values are involved
would probably lead to fundamental value judgments being made by a
highly unrepresentative body. Whether this development would re-

present a grave problem, a'positive boon or something in between is an
issue that courts and legislatures must resolve.

A less radical alternative to allowing judges to determine reasonableness when abstract values are involved is to protect abstract values

by having judges use their existing power to direct verdicts in cases in
which reasonable minds cannot differ.12 ' This judicial power has the
advantage of having passed constitutional muster and being fairly

widely accepted as a legitimate exercise of the judicial function.'

Un-

fortunately, directed verdicts are unlikely to be of much assistance in

cases where abstract values must be balanced against tangible harms.
The balancing of abstract values against tangible harms is a process of
social judgment in which the party doing the balancing ascribes relative social importance to the competing values. The balancing process is

not particularly amenable to a determination that reasonable minds
cannot differ. 123 A judge can say with some assurance that reasonable
120. Of the many possible examples of the debate over the representativeness of judges, two
will suffice to illustrate the point that the debate permeates many areas of the law. In constitutional law, the debate between interpretivists and originalists can be viewed as dispute over the
degree to which "unelected" judges may substitute their views of constitutional values for the
views of. a popularly elected legislature. Compare Cherminsky, The Supreme Court, 1988
Term-Foreward: Tije Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 74-96 (1989) (questioning
whether the practice of judges making fundamental constitutional value judgments is truly "undemocratic") with Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1971) (attacking judges' use of personal values in making decisions on constitutional
law as being antithetical to democratic theory).
In criminal law the dispute over whether courts should be free to apply common law to
crimes can also be viewed as dispute over the ability of judges to represent adequately the mores
and views of their communities as opposed to their own possibly parochial views. See Jeffries,
Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 190 (1985)
(noting that the idea that crimes should be defined by legislatures rather than judges in part rests
on the notion that the legislature is more "politically competent," i.e., representative).
121. See Vinson, supra note 116, at 1001 (suggesting that judges use their power to direct
verdicts to "reform" tort law by controlling runaway juries in tort cases); FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)
(providing for directed verdicts); infra note 122 (discussing standard for directed verdicts).
122. E.g., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); Murray E. Gildersleeve Logging Co. v. Northern Timber Corp., 670 P.2d 372 (Alaska 1983); Souper Spud, Inc. v. Aetna
2d 280,
Casualty & Surety Co., 5 Conn. App. 579, 501 A.2d 1215 (1985); Keen v. Davis, 38 111.
230 N.E.2d 859 (1967); Gibbons v. Price, 33 Ohio App. 3d 4, 514 N.E.2d 127 (1986).
123. The phrase "reasonable minds cannot differ" is the formulation of the standard for
granting a motion for a directed verdict utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1307 (6th Cir. 1988). Other courts usually
phrase the test in terms of there being "but one conclusion a reasonable person could have
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minds would not differ when considering whether it is unreasonable to
spend a million dollars for security precautions to prevent ten thousand
dollars in vandalism. Likewise, a judge may conclude that it is reasonable to spend ten thousand dollars on safety devices to save a million
dollars in personal and property damages. A judge cannot determine
with the same assurance that the value of preventing crimes in the
community is twice (or some other multiple) as important as a former
prisoner,'s right to enjoy a measure of privacy and dignity.12' The traditional judicial device of directing verdicts to control juries may be relatively uncontroversial, but it is also likely to be inefficacious in protecting abstract values.
Judicial comment upon the weight of the evidence is a more controversial juror control mechanism. 2 Judicial comment is, however,
also unlikely to be of much use in protecting abstract values. Even if
American judges could comment as freely and extensively on the evidence as their British. counterparts,' 26 - their comments still could not
directly address the importance of abstract values. A judge can perhaps
comment that a person's story of how an. accident occurred is somewhat difficult to credit. However, whit comment can be made about
the relative importance of protecting oneself from physical injury and
honoring a sincere, albeit possibly mistaken, belief that one's religion
forbids a female adherent from being on a ski lift after sundown with a
man to whom she is not married? 2 '
Although the traditional judicial prerogative to comment upon the
evidence may be of limited use in protecting abstract values, a more
focused judicial comment to the jurors (in the form of a specific corrective instruction) on the -nature of the reasonableness determination and
the nature of abstract values might seem to be more helpful. For example, in the halfway house hypothetical, the judge might instruct the
reached." 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §.2525, at 545-46
(1971) (quoting Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1971)). There appears to be no
substantive difference between the two formulations.
124. For the process of ascribing social weights to values, see supra text accompanying note
45.
125. See Vinson, supra note 116, at 1000-01 (suggesting that judges use their power to
comment on the evidence to control unfettered jury discretion and "reform" tort law). For a general discussion of the legality and limitations of judicial comment upon the evidence, see Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall and Comment on the Evidence in Jury
Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161 (1988).

126. English judges "routinely and unreservedly [make] their views on the persuasiveness of
the evidence known to the jury." Weinstein, supra note 125, at 162.
•
127. The particular balancing of values described in the text confronted the court in Friedman v. State, 54 Misc. 2d 448, 282 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1967), aff'd and modified, 31 A.D.2d 992, 297
N.Y.S.2d 850 (1969). The court had to determine if the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in
jumping from the ski lift.
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jury that, in deciding whether the supervisors of the parolee acted reasonably, they must weight the social benefits of the supervisors' actions
against the risks created by their actions. The judge would then admonish the jury that, merely because the risks created by the supervisors' behavior were readily visible, and the utility of the supervisors'
actions had no concrete manifestations, the jurors should not diminish
the importance of the latter.
Two problems stand in the way of ad hoc judicial attempts to educate jurors not to be biased against abstract values. First, under current
legal rules on the limits of judicial comment and jury instructions in
negligence cases, the type of instruction set forth above may not be
allowed. 28. Second, and more important, the utility of such an instruction is not all that clear. Experimental psychologists are deeply divided
12 9
on the efficacy of education in overcoming heuristic biases. Even if
the optimists among the psychologists who claim that the biases are
remediable are right, an effective corrective process is likely to require
laborious effort with constant feedback being given to the decisionmaker who is to be "debiased." 130 A relatively brief instruction by a
judge in the midst of a trial hardly conforms to that prescription and is
not likely to compensate for what is probably a lifetime of mental habits. For these reasons, the efficacy of corrective jury instructions in
overcoming jury biases against abstract values is questionable.
E.

The Role of Advocates in ProtectingAbstract Values

Those who assert that their conduct was reasonable because it was
justified by abstract values do not stand alone in the courtroom. They
usually have counsel representing them. This fact raises the issue of
what advocates can do to overcome the tendency of jurors to be biased
against abstract values. The obvious answer is for counsel, where possible, to try to furnish concrpte examples of the abstract value in an action in order to give the jurors readily available concrete reference
points to comprehend the significance of the abstract value. Counsel
can employ a variety of techniques in attaining this objective. For example, the attorney can follow the old nostrum in preparing expert witnesses by making sure that the expert witnesses cast their theories in
128. Cf Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 501, 525 P.2d 1033, 1040 (1974)
(requiring a judge to consider risk/utility factors in deciding whether to submit a design defect/
products liability case to the jury, but forbidding the use of the factors in jury instructions and
requiring the jury to be given a "reasonable person" instruction if the case is submitted to it); see
also C. MORRIS & R. MORRIS, supra note 7, at 60 (noting that trial judges fear reversal for
departing from the "reasonably prudent person" charge).
129. See sources cited supra note 114.
130. Edwards & Winterfeldt,,supra note 114, at 657.
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terms which are familiar to the lay juror.1 3 Attorneys also might rely
more on anecdotal, observational evidence rather than cold, gross statistical evidence. This latter suggestion runs counter to the instincts of
some trial attorneys who fear that the cold quantitative data will prove
overwhelmingly powerful for the side who introduces it.",' For example, an attorney who is faced with a choice of presenting either the

expert testimony of an anthropologist based upon her anecdotal obser-

vations or the testimony of a sociologist based upon cold, gross aggre-

gate data may wish to choose the former because it provides the jury
with vivid, recallable examples to illustrate the value the advocate is
attempting to defend.'

The problem with attempting to remedy underweighting abstract
values through alternative techniques of advocacy is that often the
techniques may be legally unavailable or unsuccessful. The use of illustrative anecdotes may, for example, be barred unless the facts related

are within the personal experience of the witness."3 Thus, in the halfway house example, a criminologist testifying on the benefits of loose
supervision of parolees in reintegrating them into society may be prevented from providing the jury with specific "success stories" unless she
has personally observed the facts she is describing.
Even if there were not legal problems with the admissibility of the
anecdotal evidence, the assistance counsel can furnish in helping jurors
appreciate abstract values is limited because some abstract values are

simply not amenable to illustration through concrete anecdotes. The
more abstract the value, the more difficult it is to illustrate through
anecdotes. While "success stories" of former criminals making valuable
contributions to society can, perhaps, make concrete the abstract value

of facilitating their reintegration into society, a similar story illustrat131. S. HAMLIN, WHAT MAKES JURIES LISTEN 281-82 (1985); Bridgers, The Selection,
Preparation, and Direct Examination of Expert Witnesses in MASTER ADVOCATES' HANDBOOK
200-01 (D. Rumsey ed. 1986).
132. Saks & Kidd, supra note 52, at 138.
133. Id.
134. Witnesses are normally not allowed to relate incidents which they have not personally
observed. 2 I. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 657(a) (1979). The common
law even extended this principal to expert witnesses who were not allowed to render an opinion
based on incidents they had not personally observed. 2 S. SALTZBURG & M. MARTIN, FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 73 (5th ed. 1990). If a jurisdiction follows this approach, illustrative anecdotes will not be admissible unless they were personally observed by the testifying expert.
The Federal Rules of Evidence and those states adopting the federal rules have tremendously
liberalized this common law rule by allowing an expert to base her opinion on facts which would
not otherwise be admissible into evidence, e.g., facts not personally observed by the expert, FED. R.
EVID. 703, and to relate the specific incidents which form the basis of her opinion. FED. R. EVID.
705. But see OHIO R. EVID. 703 (generally adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence but retaining
the common law rule that even an expert must base her opinions on facts personally observed or
already admitted into evidence at the hearing).
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ing their need to be accorded a measure of personal privacy is difficult
even to imagine.
In sum, improved advocacy is probably the method of protecting
abstract values which gives rise to the fewest adverse effects. Unfortunately, in keeping with the iron law of protection of abstract values,
evidentiary problems and the difficulty in creating readily grasped illustrations of highly abstract values make improved advocacy the least
effective method of protecting those values.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the modern law of negligence, jurors are increasingly being
called upon to weight abstract values against tangible values reflected
in tangible harm or injury. Contrary to the implicit assumptions of
some jurists, psychological evidence suggests that jurors cannot carry
out that chore in an unbiased manner. A variety of techniques for protecting abstract values is available to courts.
None of the techniques is optimal in all circumstances. In choosing
among the techniques, courts are faced with an inevitable trade-off between efficacy of the technique and undesirable side-effects. Because of
this trade-off, a court's decision on which technique to utilize will be a
difficult one. The best a court may be able to do is to experiment with
various methodologies on an ad hoc basis. In doing so, the courts will
have to weight ,not only the costs and benefits of the various techniques
but also the relative importance and abstraction of the values they are
trying to protect. Important values with constitutional implications,
such as the free exercise of religion, may call for the use of techniques
which may over-protect the value, such as fixed rules of law combined
with judicial balancing of the risks and utilities of an actor's conduct.
Less important values, such as the status of a person as a landowner,
may only merit techniques such as improved advocacy which have few
or no "side effects," but also have little efficacy in protecting the abstract value.
Other courts and commentators will not always agree that the
methodology selected by a court reaches the optimal trade-off between
efficacy and undesirable costs. Perhaps the court itself will become dissatisfied with the techniques it has adopted and adopt a different
method (or, more likely, a mix of methods) for protecting abstract values. The one thing a court should not do, however, is bury its head in
the sand by making the erroneous assumption that when jurors determine whether an actor in a negligence case acted "reasonably," the
jurors will automatically give abstract values the weight which they are
due.
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